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Abstract
This article addresses the problem of measuring social policy preferences in a valid and 
reliable way. Scholars have faced a number of challenges in measuring these preferences. 
First, it is not clear how exactly we should conceive of this domain. Second, the literature 
presents contradictory findings regarding the effect of contextual factors on policy prefer-
ences. Third, abstract preferences regarding the welfare state and information about its per-
formance can affect each other, complicating the attempt to distinguish between the two. 
Finally, latent manifestations of these preferences might not be equivalent across coun-
tries. We develop an approach that validly and reliably measures attitudes about the role 
of government in addressing inequalities in the market distribution of resources. Mixture 
modeling and in particular latent class analysis enables us to take advantage of information 
for multiple countries and survey questions while doing justice to the characteristics of the 
survey data. Using three waves of the International Social Survey Programme’s module on 
social inequality, we find that preferences towards the market and the role of government in 
the economy form four distinct clusters of individuals that we refer to as “moderate altru-
ists”, “moderate egoists”, “extreme altruists”, and “extreme egoists”. These clusters tend to 
be homogenous with respect to both abstract notions of the role the government should play 
in the economy as well as about evaluations of actual performance. The exceptions are the 
last two survey waves, for which we find that one class exhibits a mixed profile of individu-
als: solidaristic with respect to some indicators, but self-interested with respect to others.
Keywords: solidarism, self interest, social policy preferences, latent class analysis, mix-
ture modelling
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A voluminous social science literature treats solidarism, or care about the well-
being of others, as “unpredictable ‘social noise’” (Dimick et al. 2018, p. 442). Our 
study explores how to conceive of this pre-disposition (Cavaillé & Trump 2015; 
Dimick et al. 2017; Fong 2001). We do this using a latent class modeling framework 
that considers not only individual and country level determinants of these prefer-
ences, but also the equivalence of latent constructs across countries. Our research 
builds on recent work using categorical variables to capture latent preferences, and 
provides an approach to deal with lack of independence among some indicators 
used to represent them. In so doing, we can reveal preferences in a valid and reli-
able way.
Using three waves of the International Social Survey Programme’s module 
on social inequality, we find that preferences towards the market and the role of 
government in the economy form four distinct clusters of individuals that we refer 
to as “moderate altruists”, “moderate egoists”, “extreme altruists”, and “extreme 
egoists”. These clusters tend to be homogenous with respect to both abstract notions 
of the role the government should play in the economy as well as about evaluations 
of actual performance. The exceptions are the last two survey waves, for which we 
find that one class exhibits a mixed profile of individuals: solidaristic with respect 
to some indicators, but self-interested with respect to others. 
The following section discusses the challenges inherent in accurately measur-
ing social policy preferences. In section two, we introduce latent class analysis (a 
form of mixture modeling) and discuss its advantages over alternatives. We then 
apply this methodology to the task of revealing preferences in cross-national sur-
veys. Section five examines how robust our results are to alternative classifications. 
We conclude with some observations for future research.
Measuring Preferences in Survey Research: 
Empirical Challenges
Scholars have faced a number of challenges in measuring social policy preferences. 
It is not clear, for example, how exactly we should conceive of this domain. Arts 
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and Gelissen (2001) report that attitudes towards “solidaristic” policies cluster in 
one dimension, implying that individuals either support these policies or oppose 
them.1 Alesina and Angeletos (2005) conceive of self-interest and solidarity as a 
variable that ranges from identifying most closely with a libertarian ideal of mar-
kets as natural, efficient, and fair, to believing that markets not always work this 
way and should not be the sole criterion used to make allocative decisions. 
Other work implies that “other-regarding preferences” (Dimick et al. 2018) are 
not one-dimensional. Jensen and Petersen (2017, p. 68) claim for example that indi-
viduals see recipients of health care as deserving compared to recipients of unem-
ployment compensation. Cavaillé and Trump (2015) similarly claim that redistri-
bution can take on two meanings – taking from the rich and giving to the poor. 
Finally, Rehm et al. (2012, p. 390) find that when asked to evaluate social programs 
in the abstract, individuals tend to favor them due to loss aversion, the tendency to 
weigh potential losses in benefits more than potential increases in one’s post-tax 
income.2
Scholars are also unsure what effects contextual factors have on policy prefer-
ences. Dimick et al. (2017, p. 386) find that “an increase in macro-inequality will 
lead to more support for redistribution”, particularly among the rich.3 Conversely, 
Kelly and Enns (2010) and Trump (2018) find that it reduces support (irrespective of 
income) for this policy (Cavaillé & Trump 2015, p. 157). These findings, however, 
are based either on experimental data from a few counties or on longitudinal evi-
dence from the United States. Two studies with wide country-year coverage find no 
effect of country-level inequality on support for redistribution (Breznau and Hom-
merich 2019; VanHeuvelen 2017).
A final set of challenges concerns the potential for perceptions of how the 
welfare state is performing to prime abstract preferences about the desirability of 
social policies. As Trump (2018) notes, perceptions of inequality strongly predict 
whether individuals see income differences as legitimate. Gimpelson and Treis-
man (2018, p. 30) cite Niehues (2014) to the effect that “a correlation between per-
ceived inequality and the belief that it” is “too high”, as well as between perceived 
inequality and preferences for redistribution”, exists.4 More specifically, “perceived 
1 In social science research, solidarity is defined as concern for one’s group (Dimick et 
al. 2017, p. 387), whether the group is one’s class, ethnicity, or nation. Following the 
literature, we see support for policies such as income redistribution as evidence of so-
cial solidarity because these policies can benefit others in addition to oneself or others 
at one’s expense. Below, we also evaluate whether this relationship depends on one’s 
personal income.
2 In Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979, p. 279) words, “losses loom larger than gains” in 
people’s minds.
3 See also Schmidt-Catran (2016).
4 Niehues derived these correlations using the same ISSP data for Wave IV that we use 
here. See Kim et al. (2018) also. 
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inequality rather than actual inequality significantly affects redistributive prefer-
ences” (Choi 2019, 4). The opposite, preferences affecting perceptions, also occurs, 
as “more anti-redistributive preferences predict believing taxes on high earners are 
too high.” (Gingrich 2014, p. 578). 
We need a methodological approach then that empirically allows for the pos-
sibility that abstract preferences regarding the welfare state and information about 
its performance can influence each other simultaneously. This would help us move 
beyond the current impasse in the literature between standard accounts favoring 
self-interest and more recent works that also expect individuals to care about oth-
ers. Before this can happen, however, we need to put solidaristic attitudes on solid 
empirical ground. 
The Latent Class Approach
Scholars study social policy preferences using either a single survey prompt or a 
latent variable framework. In the latter case, they typically rely on principal com-
ponent or a similar factor analytic technique. Latent class analysis allows for more 
flexibility because “there is no need for normality assumptions as there is in factor 
analysis”: “instead of assuming that” [indicator] “variables follow any particular 
distribution within the classes”, “LCA lets the variables follow any distribution, 
as long as they are unrelated to each other (independent) within classes”. (Oberski 
2016, p. 7). 
The latent class approach is especially useful given recent work demonstrating 
that the multidimensionality of welfare state attitudes cannot be adequately cap-
tured using only linear measurement models (Kulin et al. 2016; Roosma et al. 2013). 
As these works make clear, individuals vary not only in their preferences regard-
ing what welfare states do, but also in their preferences about what welfare states 
should do.5 This is because people are able to distinguish “the welfare state’s goals 
and range” from “it’s efficiency, effectiveness, and policy outcomes”. (Roosma et 
al. 2013, p. 235). Accordingly, they could strongly favor the welfare state both con-
5 Individuals, in other words, vary on “the should and is aspects of welfare attitudes” 
(Roosma et al. 2014, p. 201). This is because “the public has both a relative preference 
for policy and an absolute preference” (Soroka and Wlezein 2010, p. 25). We don’t 
necessarily see the relationship between the two mechanically, however, as Soroka and 
Wlezein’s “thermostatic model” implies. In this model, the public’s relative preference 
represents the difference between its “preferred level of policy…and the level it actu-
ally gets”. In reality, individuals rely on heuristic shortcuts to form their views, par-
ticularly when demands on their cognitive capacity are high. They thus display what 
is known as “bounded rationality” (O’Grady 2017). This explains why “preferences for 
redistribution and social spending”, once formed, only change in response to “large 
changes in economic circumstances” (O’Grady 2017).
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cretely and in the abstract, oppose it on both grounds, embrace an ambitious role 
for social policy in the abstract while being critical about its outcomes, or approve 
of outcomes while being critical of stated goals. The four possible attitudinal pro-
files, moreover, can manifest themselves differently across countries. 
If, as alluded to above, individuals’ perceptions of how the welfare state per-
forms affect their attitudes about what the welfare state should do and vice-versa, 
we need a methodology that can handle these “possible feedback effects” (Roosma 
et al. 2014, p. 201).6 In latent class modeling, interactions between the latent vari-
able and indicator variables, usually omitted, enables consideration of these effects. 
As noted above, it is usually assumed that the observed indicators are mutually 
independent (or uncorrelated) conditional on the latent variable (Oberski 2016, 
p. 11). This requires the omission of all interaction terms between the latent con-
struct and indicator variables (hence the independence assumption). Relaxing this 
assumption enables consideration of feedback effects by specifying higher order 
interaction terms. (Magidson & Vermunt 2001, p. 226). 
The model essentially asks how likely a subject is to belong to one of N cat-
egories in a nominal variable we dub solidarity. Individuals are then grouped into 
exclusive subpopulations “based on similar patterns of observed cross-sectional 
and/or longitudinal data.” (Berlin et al. 2014, p. 175). The resulting classes are 
“characterized not by exact response patterns but by response profiles or typolo-
gies described by the relative frequencies of item endorsements” (Masyn 2013, p. 
556). Predictor variables can be used to facilitate the placement of observations into 
classes, in which case the goal is to examine whether covariates can explain “mean 
differences in outcomes across latent classes” (Berlin et al. 2014, p. 175). 
Studying multiple policies and countries can pose problems if latent constructs 
are non-invariant cross-nationally (Alemán & Woods 2016). To avoid problems 
with measurement invariance, researchers typically rely on dichotomized versions 
of survey indicators (VanHeuvelen 2017, p. 49). One advantage of LCA, which has 
not been widely used to explain social policy preferences, is that it provides a rigor-
ous and systematic framework for investigating construct equivalence (Kankaraš & 
Moors 2009; Moors 2004). The approach, dubbed “multigroup latent class struc-
ture modeling”, can easily diagnose and accommodate several forms of parameter 
heterogeneity.7
In sum, a latent class approach allows us to measure a construct that cannot 
be perfectly measured while doing justice to the data generating process (Oberski 
6 Roosma et al. describe these different dimensions, but not their possible feedback ef-
fects. 
7 Similar approaches such as multigroup confirmatory factor analysis (MCFA) exist for 
models with continuous indicator and latent variables. Multigroup latent class structure 
modeling, however, outperforms its counterparts (Kankaraš et al. 2011).
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2016). We believe this method elicits preferences about social policy based on indi-
vidual characteristics and exposure to varying contexts.
Data Sources and Variables
We use public opinion data from the International Social Survey Programme (here-
after ISSP) to examine whether individuals can be sorted into classes based on their 
attitudes towards the market allocation of resources and the role of government in 
molding this allocation. One advantage of the ISSP is that it has carried out peri-
odic surveys of attitudes towards social inequality (the Social Inequality series). 
These questionnaires, administered in 1987, 1992, 1999, and 2009, target a variety 
of countries, mostly democracies. We are able to use all survey waves except the 
third one, which did not provide enough information to standardize the income or 
earnings of survey respondents. Despite the varying number of countries, years, 
and individuals surveyed, our goal is to find similarities in this heterogeneity.8 
Table 1 presents a list of questions that can be used to assess social policy pref-
erences, along with the year(s) the survey wave containing the question was admin-
istered. Our choice of questions was motivated by our desire to tap into preferences 
regarding the goals and capabilities of the welfare state, as well as to evoke assess-
ments of government efforts in targeting particular groups (i.e., the unemployed, 
the poor, students, the middle class). One advantage of the ISSP is that all ques-
tions have the same ordinal ranking, with 1 usually implying strong agreement, 3 
neutrality, and 5 strong disagreement. To facilitate analysis and interpretation, we 
recoded some variables so as to have higher values denote increasing social soli-
darity or progressivism.9 
While there is much continuity in questions from survey to survey, some ques-
tions are missing from some of the waves.10 We consider this an advantage since we 
are trying to estimate attitudes that are latent and as such, do not exhibit a perfect 
correspondence with our survey instruments. 
Of the twelve questions displayed in Table 1, some clearly elicit general beliefs 
about the fairness of the market mechanism and the role that government plays 
in shaping it, while others evoke an evaluation of the status quo. We first selected 
8 The number of countries in the analysis, which is based on data availability, ranges 
from five in 1992 to thirty-one in 2009. Appendix A contains a list of countries we 
studied, organized by wave. 
9 Following standard practice, we excluded from the analysis respondents who are un-
sure or uncooperative.
10 We were able to use most questions fielded, except for those which contained more 
missing than complete observations – poor and unemployed in Wave II and university 
in Waves II, III, and IV. The percent of missing observations for unemployed in Wave 
II, for example, is 88.67, while for poor it is 88.77. 
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questions that we thought tap abstract attitudes and perceptions, moving then to 
those that seem to elicit a comment on the status quo. The first seven questions 
evoke abstract beliefs about economic fairness while questions eight through ten 
are evaluative. Based solely on their phrasing, question eleven seems to probe 
Table 1 Indicators of solidarity/self-interest 
Question Variable name Years asked
It is the responsibility of the government 
to reduce differences in income between 
people with high incomes and people with 
low incomes11
government responsibility 1987, 1992, 2009
The government should provide a decent 
standard of living for the unemployed
unemployed 1987, 2009
The government should provide more 
chances for children from poor families to 
go to university
university 1987
The government should provide a job for 
everyone who wants one
job guarantee 1987, 1992
The government should provide everyone 
with a guaranteed basic income
basic income 1987, 1992
Is it just or unjust - right or wrong - that 
people with higher incomes can buy better 
health care than people with lower incomes?
private health care just 2009
Is it just or unjust - right or wrong - that 
people with higher incomes can buy better 
education for their children than people 
with lower incomes?
private education just 2009
The government should spend less on ben-
efits for the poor
poor 1987, 2009
Differences in income in [respondent’s 
country] are too large
income differences 1987, 1992, 2009
Generally, how would you describe taxes in 
[respondent’s country] today for those with 
high incomes?
top taxes 1987, 1992, 2009
Do you think people with high incomes 
should pay a larger share of their income in 
taxes than those with low incomes?
progressive taxation 1987, 1992, 2009
Inequality continues to exist because it 
benefits the rich and powerful
inequality helps the rich 1987, 1992
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abstract attitudes towards inequality and redistribution, while question twelve lends 
itself to both kinds of interpretation.     11
Existing studies provide a mixed picture regarding the effects of demographic 
variables on social policy attitudes (Breznau 2010, p. 476). We control for these 
characteristics since they are standard in the public opinion literature. We also con-
trol for several country-level variables that have featured prominently in the litera-
ture.
Sex is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 for females and 0 for males. 
In the literature, men are generally shown to exhibit less solidarity than women.
Age ranges vary by survey wave but for the population as a whole it is a con-
tinuous variable ranging in value from 15 to 98. 
Education. Competition from immigrants may cause workers with little edu-
cation to oppose programs that could be construed as enhancing the labor market 
prospects of other similarly skilled workers (Alt & Iversen 2017, p. 21; Kunovich 
2009, p. 575). An additional factor bearing on the preferences of dissimilarly edu-
cated workers is the extent to which education increases class solidarity. As Kunov-
ich (2009, p. 575) notes, “[i]ndividuals with greater cognitive skills (i.e., more edu-
cation) … can better imagine belonging to larger groups”. This implies a positive 
correlation between education and solidaristic attitudes. 
The literature on the link between labor market risks and welfare state atti-
tudes, however, makes a convincing case that better-educated individuals have 
more skills, which could imply that they have more stable income streams, antici-
pate upward mobility more, and need social policies less (O’Grady 2017, p. 5). This 
raises the possibility that education increases self-interest and vice versa (Alesina 
& Giuliano 2011, p. 21; Breznau 2010, p. 461; Gimpelson & Treisman 2017, p. 19). 
In Wave I, education is a categorical variable with nine categories ranging 
from “None, still at school” to “Complete University”, with adjustments in the num-
ber of categories made for certain countries reflecting variation in educational sys-
tems around the world. In Wave II, education refers to years of schooling, which is 
a continuous variable. In Wave IV, education is a categorical variable with ‘no for-
mal qualification’ as the first category followed by 2) lowest formal qualification; 
3) above lowest qualification; 4) higher secondary level completed; 5) above higher 
secondary level; and 6) university degree completed.
Personal income. The median voter theory (Meltzer & Richard 1981), the bed-
rock of much political economy work, predicts a negative relationship between pre-
tax and -transfer income and demand for redistribution. We thus expect that “the 
(relatively) poor support redistribution more than the (relatively) rich” (Dimick et 
al. 2017, p. 386).
11 According to Choi (2019, p. 15), this is “the most widely used measure of redistributive 
preferences in empirical studies.”
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The ISSP provides two measures of personal well-being, one labeled “family 
income” and the other “earnings”. For some countries the measures refer to pre-tax 
and -transfer earnings and for others to net income. Whether individuals correctly 
perceive their income as being pre-tax and -transfer or net is questionable, but this 
is not likely to bias the results unless these perceptions are non-randomly distrib-
uted. In addition, in some countries individuals were asked to report monthly, in 
others yearly amounts. Finally, the precise amounts reported by survey participants 
in Waves I and II contains a lot of missing data. 
We could use self-reported social class in lieu of a more objective measure 
of welfare. Subjective measures, however, “also capture psychological elements 
besides actual income” (Midtbø 2017, p. 6). This poses a problem if the two vary 
greatly or in ways that are unknown across countries. In all three survey waves we 
study, moreover, earnings and family income are moderately correlated, while sub-
jective social class correlates weakly with both. A measure in Waves I and II that 
provides income and earning brackets for respondents to choose from is more com-
plete. For these waves, we thus follow Dimick et al. (2018) in creating two variables 
using the robust Pareto midpoint estimator (von Hippel et al. 2016). These variables 
contain the midpoint yearly income and earnings corresponding to each reported 
category, “while the value for the final open-ended bin is imputed from a Pareto 
distribution” (Dimick et al. 2018, p. 452). Since the amounts reported are in local 
currencies, we calculated standard deviations from the country mean and used 
those in our models (Dion & Birchfield 2010, pp. 321-322; Rehm 2011, p. 279). For 
Wave IV, we are able to use the income and earnings figures individuals reported.12
Redistribution. Spending (of tax receipts) by governments on social programs 
accounts for much of the variation across democracies in “redistributive effort”. 
“Spending questions […however,] ask people about priorities relative to very differ-
ent national baselines.” (Rehm 2012, p. 399). What is needed then is a measure of 
relative redistribution, or absolute redistribution divided by market inequality. Our 
measure of income redistribution is thus the reduction in the Gini coefficient due to 
taxes and transfers as a ratio of this coefficient (Solt 2016).
GDP per capita. Individuals in less developed and highly unequal societies 
seem more concerned with the needs of others than their counterparts in more 
developed and egalitarian societies (Dion & Birchfield 2010; VanHeuvelen 2017). 
Fong (211, p. 242) similarly claims that perceived poverty increases support for 
redistribution among high-income earners. To assess the effect of development on 
attitudes towards social policy, we use a measure of real GDP in 2011 US dollars 
given in purchasing power parity (or PPP) terms. We divide this measure by a coun-
try’s population to obtain per capita measures. The Penn World Table (Feenstra et 
al. 2015) is the source for these variables. 
12 One benefit of having income and earnings data in local currencies is that this method 
of accounting minimizes errors. 
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Economic growth. Economic growth could facilitate solidaristic tendencies 
by making people better off. If a majority believe, however, “in insuring industri-
ous people against bad luck, but not providing unconditional assistance to the poor 
if their condition is due to idleness” (Fong 2001, p. 242), individuals may be less 
likely to care for others when they regard the economic environment as good. We 
represent economic growth using a measure of inflation-adjusted growth in GDP 
per capita from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2017). 
Unemployment rate. Some have claimed that unemployment should increase 
support for welfare policies (Breznau 2010, p. 13; VanHeuvelen 2017, p. 45). Wehl 
(2018) however finds that unemployment does not significantly explain support for 
labor market policies. VanHeuvelen (2017) also found that unemployment does not 
significantly increase support for redistribution. Our variable refers to those who 
are unemployed in a given year as a share of the active labor force. This data, 
originally compiled by the International Labor Organization, was similarly derived 
from the WDI dataset.
Employment status. An important question is whether employed and unem-
ployed respondents regard social policy in a similar fashion. Some have claimed 
that the employed, also known as insiders in countries with labor market duali-
ties and high unemployment, favor government programs that insure or redistribute 
income if the beneficiaries are insiders like themselves and not the unemployed 
(Moene & Wallerstein 2001, 2003; Rueda 2007). 
Church attendance. An important literature has claimed that religiosity 
makes individuals disapprove of social insurance even when they stand to benefit 
from it (De la O & Rodden 2008; Scheve & Stasavage 2006). Poor religious voters 
accordingly prioritize moral issues. This could make these individuals appear less 
solidaristic than secular ones.13 Breznau (2010, p. 474) found, however, that church 
attendance had “little to no influence on [welfare] policy preferences”. We evaluate 
these expectations using a question about the frequency of attending religious ser-
vices. For Waves I and II, we use a categorical variable with six categories, whereas 
in Wave IV the same variable contains eight categories. 
Partisanship. A large literature has claimed that “Left-Right placement bun-
dles together a variety of policy attitudes and value orientations … the strongest 
of which are attitudes connected to the extent of state involvement in the economy 
and the limits to redistribution” (Bosancianu 2017, p. 1592). We thus include in our 
models a measure of partisan affiliation that ranges from far-left to far-right and 
also includes choices for “Other, no specific party” and “No party preference”. 
13 Aversion to social insurance, however, should not be taken to imply that religious indi-
viduals cannot behave altruistically by, for example, donating money to their churches 
or other charities. Logically speaking, these individuals could be very altruistic in the 
private sphere, while opposing government social programs on principle and/or based 
on their performance.
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Before reporting our findings, we note that for Waves I and IV, values are 
given for 1986 and 2008 respectively. For Wave II, because the year of fieldwork 
was in some cases 1993 and in one case 1991, values given for the variables are 
for 1992. Regarding our specifications, due to the ordered and categorical nature 
of our indicators, we use ordered logistic regression for the measurement portion 
of the model. The probability of placing in one of the classes is modeled using 
multinomial logistic regression. We use sampling weights to account for over- and 
under-sampled observations.14 
Exploratory Analysis
We begin by noting that we follow a specific model development strategy before 
settling on our preferred specification (Vermunt & Magidson 2005, p. 43). First, 
we estimate unconditional models (or models without covariates) with 2, 3, and 
4 latent clusters. We then add covariates to these models (conditional estimation) 
to improve model fit. At every step, we examine the log likelihood (LL) and the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for information on parsimony and fit, respec-
tively. Generally speaking, lower values for these statistics indicate a better fit. 
For all three waves, a model with 4 clusters fits the data best, as evidenced 
especially by the BIC. Adding covariates also led to large reductions in this statis-
tic, confirming their role in helping to measure the latent variable. For all waves, 
we also explored construct equivalence. As Nagelkerke et al. (2016) point out, the 
assumption of unit independence is automatically violated when observations are 
nested in groups, as in many studies featuring surveys conducted in multiple coun-
tries. In this case, it is important “to detect misfit that originates from the model 
not fitting particular groups as well as others.” (Nagelkerke et al. 2016, p. 255). 
Nagelkerke et al. define a between-group bivariate residual that is calculated by 
using the grouping variable as a nominal covariate with its effect set equal to 0 
(Vermunt & Magidson 2016, p. 121). The model is then estimated and residuals 
examined between pairs of indicator variables, pairs of covariates and indicators, 
and between the grouping variable and indicators. The latter in particular can be 
evaluated for evidence of parameter heterogeneity across countries. 
“[L]arge residuals indicate large direct effects of particular group vari-
ables…If…large residuals are associated with group variables, an appropri-
ate strategy is to include the direct effects of the group variable with the 
largest residuals, re-estimate the model and check the updated residuals 
after this new model is estimated. This procedure can be repeated until all 
14 The variables used for weighting are v107, v176, and weight respectively.
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of the residuals between group variables and response variables become 
small.” (Moors 2004, p. 309). 
In Wave I, all ten bivariate residuals between the grouping variable and indicators 
exceeded 3.84.15 In Wave II’s case, 4 out of 7 bivariate residuals exceeded this 
value. For Wave IV, the number is 8 out of 8. We thus concluded that there was sig-
nificant country-level heterogeneity in parameters in all three specifications. Con-
sequently, we proceeded to explore the possibility of modeling this heterogeneity 
using various kinds of random effects/multilevel models (Henry & Muthén 2010; 
Vermunt 2003). Once again, a multilevel model can be compared to a model with-
out random effects using the LL and BIC test statistics.
The simplest random effects specification is a parametric model in which 
intercepts for the latent classes are allowed to vary randomly. In these models, the 
individual-level latent classes vary in size by country, but all other parameters are 
“fixed”. The random effects themselves follow a continuous distribution of means 
across groups. There is also a non-parametric version of this model which con-
ceives of countries not as continuous random means, but as belonging to a smaller 
set of discrete groups that in turn affect the intercepts of the individual classes 
(Henry & Muthén 2010). The grouping of countries in the varieties of capitalism 
literature offers an example of the ways in which countries could be modeled in the 
level 2 analysis (as liberal or coordinated market economies) (e.g., Larsen 2008). In 
this case, at least two country-level classes need to be specified. Figure 1 provides 
a visual summary of our 4-cluster solution for the indicator variables in Wave I.
As Figure 1 indicates, four classes are clearly delineated in the ten indicator 
variables used to measure attitudes towards social policy in Wave I. The cluster 
comprising the most members is Cluster 1, which appears to be composed of indi-
viduals who are moderately solidaristic. The second largest cluster is reserved for 
moderately self-interested individuals, with “extreme egoists” and “extreme altru-
ists” a distant third and fourth places respectively. This plot confirms what scholars 
have recently observed, that the welfare state in advanced capitalist democracies is 
popular (Roosma et al. 2013) and that this is in part due to loss aversion (Rehm et 
al. 2012). The best fitting model for Wave I, it turns out, is a non-parametric estima-
tion with two country-level latent classes affecting the intercepts for the individual 
level classes. It is not hard to see how this would occur in a model where education 
does not have a uniform number of categories across countries. 
It is important to note that for the tables that follow, a positive coefficient 
implies that a particular variable is more likely to place/keep individuals in a cer-
tain class, whereas a negative one indicates that the variable is likely to place indi-
viduals in a different class. Table 2 presents the results for Wave I.
15 “For 1 degree of freedom effects, bivariate residuals larger than 3.84 indicate statistical 
significance at the .05 level. (Vermunt & Magidson 2005, p. 125).
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As Table 2 indicates, specifying random effects is warranted – level-2 classes 
affect intercepts for individual-level clusters in a statistically significant way. In our 
discussion of these individual-level results, we speak primarily about Cluster 1, the 
largest class of individuals. As Table 2 indicates, all covariates significantly explain 
placement into a particular class. As expected, females, those with little education, 
the unemployed, those who lean left ideologically, and the less well-off tend to be 
more solidaristic than males, those who are more educated, the employed, the bet-
ter off economically, and right of center individuals. Regarding the country level 
variables, economic growth and redistribution are negatively associated with social 
solidarity while unemployment has a positive association. Contrary to claims made 
recently regarding the effect of religiosity on preferences towards social policy 
(De la O & Rodden 2008; Scheve & Stasavage 2006), we find that more religious 
individuals exhibit more social solidarity than less religious ones. Finally, the age 
of the respondent is not predictably associated with a particular orientation across 
clusters.
Table 2 also provides a model for the indicators with an R² that captures how 
well the latent variable explains these. There is evidence that the latent variable is 
primarily picking up attitudes about income differences and what role the govern-
ment should have, if any, in reducing them because government responsibility and 
income differences have the highest R²s. Government responsibility elicits abstract 
preferences or attitudes about the welfare state, while income differences is a com-
ment on the status quo. 
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 Figure 1 Profile plot of cluster solution for the latent class analysis of Wave I
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Similar to Wave II, a model with four clusters is more parsimonious and fits 
the data best in the case of Wave II. This time, however, the addition of random 
parameters does not bring about an improvement over our baseline model. As a 
result, we retain a model with 4 clusters whose main difference with respect to 
Wave I is that there is now a group of individuals (Cluster 4) who exhibit a mixed 
attitudinal profile: they are rather self-interested in their conception of what the 
welfare state should do (reduce income differences and guarantee everyone a job 
and a basic income), but progressive in their evaluation of its results. Once again, 
“moderate altruists” lead in numbers, but “moderate egoists” do not make up the 
second most numerous class. Instead, Cluster 2 is composed of individuals who are 
very self-interested, followed by individuals who are very solidaristic (Cluster 3). 
Figure 2 provides a visual summary of the solution for Wave II.
Table 2 Multilevel LCA of attitudes towards social policy in seven countries 
(1987)
Model for Indicators Wald p-value R²
government responsibility 208.971 0.000 0.584
unemployed 17.147 0.001 0.200
university 187.976 0.000 0.243
jobs 195.038 0.000 0.379
poor 143.626 0.000 0.145
basic income 53.053 0.000 0.367
income differences 168.399 0.000 0.540
top taxes 50.525 0.000 0.189
progressive taxation 123.203 0.000 0.164
inequality benefits the rich 87.934 0.000 0.307
Model for Clusters
Intercept Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Wald p-value
N 1404 1318 450 321
group class 1 3.009 0.651 -3.744 0.084 163.092 0.000
group class 2 2.351 1.086 -2.474 -0.963 144.747 0.000
Covariates
sex
male -0.138 -0.059 0.311 -0.114 148.023 0.000
female 0.138 0.059 -0.311 0.114
age -0.008 -0.007 0.009 0.006 23.450 0.000
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education
none/still at school 0.816 -0.061 -1.432 0.677 109717.219 0.000
0.579 0.030 -1.786 1.177
0.054 -0.067 -0.348 0.361
-0.060 0.125 0.162 -0.226
-0.248 0.068 0.433 -0.254
-0.127 0.156 0.319 -0.348
-0.413 0.042 0.772 -0.401
-0.329 -0.170 1.099 -0.600
complete university -0.273 -0.123 0.781 -0.385
Model for Clusters
Intercept Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Wald p-value
GDP growth -0.152 -0.539 -0.813 1.504 120.001 0.000
unemployment 0.011 0.084 0.161 -0.255 143.224 0.000
employment status
unemployed 0.068 -0.025 -0.518 0.475 85.964 0.000
employed -0.068 0.025 0.518 -0.475
income -0.077 0.121 0.320 -0.363 33.628 0.000
redistribution -0.012 -0.021 0.001 0.032 52.767 0.000
GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 28.592 0.000
partisanship
far left 4.044 -3.865 -4.311 4.131 110428.720 0.000
left 1.094 0.412 -1.147 -0.359
center 0.313 0.786 0.523 -1.621
right -0.032 0.763 1.256 -1.987
far right -6.586 1.949 3.586 1.051
other, not specified 0.827 -0.392 0.095 -0.530
no party preference 0.340 0.347 -0.003 -0.684
church attendance
once a week 0.114 0.003 -0.376 0.259 41109.523 0.000
1-3 times a month 0.247 0.167 -0.397 -0.017
several times a year -0.066 -0.096 0.504 -0.342
once or twice a year -0.183 0.088 -0.067 0.163
less frequently -0.051 0.027 0.375 -0.351
never -0.061 -0.190 -0.039 0.290
Model for group classes
Intercept Class 1 Class 2 Wald p-value
0.5152 -0.5152 1.584 0.21
Overall N 3345.32
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Figure 2 Profile plot of cluster solution for the latent class analysis of Wave II
Other differences between Waves 1 and 2, albeit minor, are that in the latter case 
an individual’s employment status does not emerge as a statistically significant pre-
dictor of his/her attitudes about social policy. In addition, both GDP growth and 
personal income are associated with moderate social solidarity (they both increase 
the likelihood of placing in Cluster 1). Table 3 presents the results for this model.
Table 3 Multilevel LCA of attitudes towards social policy in five countries 
(1992)
Model for Indicators Wald p-value R²
government responsibility 346.311 0.000 0.559
jobs 402.222 0.000 0.462
basic income 444.764 0.000 0.433
income differences 617.964 0.000 0.498
top taxes 401.919 0.000 0.262
progressive taxation 358.124 0.000 0.208
inequality benefits the rich 321.064 0.000 0.234
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Model for Clusters
Intercept Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Wald p-value
N 2872 921 808 753
10.567 11.894 -7.418 -15.044 71.550 0.000
Covariates
sex
male -0.125 0.183 -0.163 0.105 37.134 0.000
female 0.125 -0.183 0.163 -0.105
age -0.010 -0.005 0.000 0.014 22.072 0.000
education -0.073 0.122 -0.100 0.051 105.759 0.000
GDP growth 0.834 1.088 0.498 -2.419 107.419 0.000
unemployment 0.163 0.420 0.068 -0.651 30.871 0.000
employment status
unemployed 0.050 -0.005 0.033 -0.079 3.124 0.370
employed -0.050 0.005 -0.033 0.079
income 0.157 0.475 -1.023 0.391 48.010 0.000
redistribution -0.053 -0.164 0.146 0.071 71.414 0.000
GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 146.580 0.000
partisanship
far left 1.495 -4.760 2.228 1.037 309.598 0.000
left 0.291 0.142 -0.093 -0.340
center -0.078 0.849 -0.598 -0.173
right -0.553 1.774 -1.028 -0.193
far right -0.125 0.641 -0.450 -0.066
other, not specified -0.783 0.629 0.261 -0.107
no party preference -0.248 0.727 -0.321 -0.158
church attendance
once a week 0.101 -0.225 -0.144 0.268 55.588 0.000
1-3 times a month 0.165 -0.244 0.059 0.019
several times a year 0.049 0.210 -0.176 -0.084
once or twice a year -0.032 0.155 -0.151 0.029
less frequently -0.138 0.083 -0.032 0.087
never -0.145 0.021 0.443 -0.319
Overall N 5354
We turn now to Wave IV, which also yields four clusters. Figure 3 provides a visual 
summary of this solution. 
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Figure 3 Profile plot of cluster solution for the latent class analysis of Wave IV
Figure 3 indicates that once again, the most numerous class is composed of indi-
viduals who are moderately solidaristic (Cluster 1). As with Wave II, there is also 
a class of individuals that has a mixed profile of attitudes, and together they make 
up the second largest group (Cluster 4). The third largest group is composed of 
individuals who are moderately self-interested (Cluster 3). The least numerous class 
(Cluster 2) groups individuals who are very solidaristic. Table 4 presents full results 
for this model. 
The most notable differences that emerged with respect to previous results 
are as follows. First, the unemployment rate is now associated with a significant 
decrease and redistribution with a significant increase in solidaristic attitudes. Sec-
ond, being employed is now associated with a positive and being unemployed with 
a negative propensity for moderate solidarism, although these coefficients are not 
highly significant statistically. Third, far-left partisanship and attending religious 
services several times per week are negatively associated with moderate solidarity, 
although the association of far-left partisanship with extreme solidarity is positive. 
Fourth, the indicators that are best explained by the latent variable are the ones 
unique to this wave asking how just it is that people with higher incomes can buy 
better health care and education than people with more modest means. Finally, we 
found that the Wald test statistic and its associated p-value cannot be computed for 
GDP per capita.
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Table 4 LCA of attitudes towards social policy in thirty-one countries (2009)
Model for Indicators Wald p-value R²
government responsibility 1651.472 0.000 0.449
unemployed 1041.153 0.000 0.226
poor 568.812 0.000 0.064
income differences 1351.697 0.000 0.351
top taxes 1229.374 0.000 0.220
progressive taxation 1463.533 0.000 0.207
private health care just 1625.358 0.000 0.605
private education just 1567.072 0.000 0.581
Model for Clusters
Intercept Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Wald p-value
0.095 -0.839 -0.412 1.157 93.127 0.000
N 14637 2698 2718 3087
Covariates
sex
male -0.088 -0.114 0.156 0.046 106.709 0.000
female 0.088 0.114 -0.156 -0.046
age -0.001 0.010 -0.007 -0.002 77.039 0.000
education
no formal qualification 0.048 -0.279 0.100 0.131 167.936 0.000
lowest formal qualification 0.041 0.093 -0.278 0.144
above lowest qualification 0.152 0.272 -0.482 0.058
higher secondary  
completed -0.011 0.046 -0.005 -0.031
above higher secondary 
level, other qualification -0.080 -0.011 0.297 -0.207
university degree  
completed -0.151 -0.122 0.368 -0.095
GDP growth 0.061 0.000 -0.009 -0.051 65.469 0.000
unemployment -0.004 -0.027 -0.019 0.049 66.280 0.000
employment status
unemployed -0.001 0.015 -0.072 0.058 10.479 0.015
employed 0.001 -0.015 0.072 -0.058
income -0.025 -0.277 0.279 0.022 186.518 0.000
redistribution 0.003 0.048 -0.019 -0.032 646.900 0.000
GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . .
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partisanship
far left -0.036 0.900 -0.760 -0.105 909.720 0.000
left 0.156 0.449 -0.701 0.095
center 0.059 -0.170 0.113 -0.002
right -0.092 -0.771 0.937 -0.074
far right -0.058 -0.398 0.429 0.026
other, not specified -0.008 0.104 -0.175 0.079
no party preference -0.022 -0.114 0.156 -0.019
church attendance
several times per week -0.194 -0.173 0.161 0.206 208.831 0.000
once a week 0.032 -0.214 0.166 0.015
2 or 3 times a month -0.033 -0.160 0.286 -0.093
Once a month -0.040 -0.158 0.051 0.147
Several times a year 0.051 0.277 -0.338 0.010
Once a year 0.048 0.068 -0.155 0.039
less than once a year 0.117 -0.024 0.074 -0.166
never 0.019 0.383 -0.245 -0.157
Overall N 23,426
Robustness Checks
We look for possible deviations from the assumption that indicator variables are 
conditionally independent (that is, unrelated to each other within classes) and re-
specify our models. In so doing, we retain the most parsimonious model possible 
(i.e., the one with the smallest number of additional parameters), while improving 
model fit. 
Conditional independence can be examined by looking at the correlation of 
indicator variables by class both before and after observations have been grouped 
into classes. We found that some of the indicator variables in Waves I and II had 
moderately significant correlations prior to observations being sorted into classes. 
After being sorted into classes, however, these pairwise correlations became sta-
tistically insignificant and/or very slight. Results for Wave IV indicated, however, 
that the variables referring to the right to pay privately for better health care and 
education do correlate very highly before the analysis (r=0.775; p=0.000). Class 
clustering is able to moderate this correlation, but the bivariate residual for this pair 
in the model reported in Table 4 is still 1681.840. 
To see how these correlations affect the results, we reexamine the model we 
previously estimated. We restrict the four highest bivariate residuals (the residual 
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for the private healthcare just and private education just pair and three others) to 
0 and re-estimate the model. The resulting specification relaxes the assumption 
of conditional independence, possibly changing the relationship between the latent 
variable and indicators, and between covariates and indicators. Table 5 presents the 
results for our modified latent class analysis of Wave IV. 
Table 5 Modified LCA of attitudes towards social policy in thirty-one 
countries (2009)
Model for Indicators
Wald p-value R²
government responsibility 2447.846 0.000 0.511
unemployment 770.994 0.000 0.254
poor 272.998 0.000 0.095
income differences 2143.097 0.000 0.392
top taxes 1120.467 0.000 0.258
progressive taxation 1079.735 0.000 0.183
private healthcare just 418.947 0.000 0.247
private education just 145.986 0.000 0.222
Model for Clusters
Intercept Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Wald p-value
-2.207 -2.547 -5.376 10.130 114.620 0.000
N 16093 2312 2370 2365
Covariates
sex
male -0.069 -0.080 0.204 -0.055 79.287 0.000
female 0.069 0.080 -0.204 0.055
age 0.000 0.011 -0.006 -0.005 65.249 0.000
education
no formal qualification 0.043 -0.265 0.340 -0.119 237.110 0.000
lowest formal qualification 0.048 0.171 -0.636 0.417
above lowest qualification 0.180 0.334 -0.678 0.164
higher secondary  
completed -0.078 -0.062 0.004 0.135
above higher secondary 
level, other qualification -0.104 -0.064 0.415 -0.247
university degree  
completed -0.090 -0.113 0.555 -0.351
GDP growth 0.313 0.254 0.217 -0.783 40.373 0.000
unemployment 0.001 -0.030 0.042 -0.013 15.175 0.002
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employment status
unemployed 0.003 0.011 -0.044 0.030 1.970 0.580
employed -0.003 -0.011 0.044 -0.030
income -0.026 -0.272 0.343 -0.046 194.407 0.000
relative redistribution 0.071 0.107 0.063 -0.240 238.113 0.000
GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 154.670 0.000
partisanship
far left -0.037 0.746 -1.201 0.492 736.296 0.000
left 0.333 0.586 -0.556 -0.363
center 0.073 -0.049 0.207 -0.231
right 0.056 -0.508 1.214 -0.761
far right 0.154 -0.096 0.751 -0.809
other, not specified -0.745 -0.666 -0.776 2.187
no party preference 0.166 -0.012 0.361 -0.516
church attendance
several times per week -0.255 -0.068 -0.209 0.533 120.067 0.000
Once a week 0.145 -0.010 0.285 -0.421
2 or 3 times a month 0.115 -0.069 0.303 -0.349
Once a month 0.052 -0.199 0.017 0.130
Several times a year -0.016 0.143 -0.227 0.100
Once a year -0.004 -0.002 -0.118 0.124
less than once a year 0.079 -0.037 0.103 -0.145
never -0.115 0.242 -0.154 0.028
Overall N 23,426
As Table 5 indicates, our software is now able to compute the Wald test statistic 
and its associated p-value for GDP per capita. Coefficients for age, unemployment 
and unemployed status have also turned positive, while the coefficient for employed 
is now negative. While employed and unemployed display the same signs as in the 
previous two waves, employment status overall has lost its statistical significance. 
Perhaps more importantly, R²s for private healthcare just and private education 
just have significantly decreased, while government responsibility and income dif-
ferences emerge once again as the indicators with the highest R²s. This indicates 
that in its configuration, the latent class model for Wave IV is similar to the models 
for Waves I and II once the most glaring forms of conditional dependence have 
been properly handled. 
With a refined model the number of observations by cluster can change, as 
Table 5 makes clear. Just as importantly, however, the BIC has declined in value. 
Having added one parameter (or restriction) to the model, researchers should check 
bivariate residuals again for additional parameters to restrict until all residuals 
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exhibit acceptable values. As more residuals are set to 0 and the ones left unre-
stricted decrease in value, we obtain diminishing increases in model fit (as judged 
by progressively lower BIC values), and more stability in parameters (the size of 
indicator and covariate coefficients and their signs). Due to space constraints, we do 
not report these checks here.16 
We re-estimated our models with earnings instead of family income and 
obtained similar results except for Wave I, which exhibits a four-cluster profile 
somewhat different from the one we had originally obtained. Most likely, this is 
because data on earnings is not available for the Netherlands, and the country thus 
drops out of the estimation. We also experimented with a slightly modified form 
of latent class analysis, latent class factor analysis (Magidson & Vermunt 2001). 
LCFA is a form of exploratory factor analysis that conceives of attributes (self-
interest and solidarism for example) as dichotomous latent factors rather than dis-
tinct classes. Instead of four latent classes, we would speak then of two dichoto-
mous latent factors “with fixed and equidistant category scores” (Kankaraš et al. 
2011, p. 284). While this allows individuals to have a position on each factor, LCFA 
achieves identification by omitting higher order interactions of the sort used previ-
ously. We thus found that our latent class models, judging by their lower BICs, fit 
the data better.
As a final check on our results, we estimated a model with data for all waves 
pooled into a single analysis. Since there are only four indicators common to all 
waves – government responsibility, income differences, top taxes, and progres-
sive taxation – these are the only variables available to proxy for the latent con-
struct. As before, we estimate models with 2, 3, and 4 latent classes. This time, we 
are able to work with thirty-two countries containing 32,678 observations.17 Once 
again, a model with 4 classes fits the data best, judging by the BIC test statistic. As 
expected, the resulting class profile falls somewhere between the profiles for waves 
II and IV, with a class of individuals displaying a mixed set of attitudes.
We repeated the analyses with ISSP data from the Role of Government mod-
ule. This questionnaire has the advantage of offering questions similar to the 
ones used here, in addition to questions on whether it should be the government’s 
responsibility to provide decent housing for all and to care for seniors. Although we 
observed four classes underlying responses to these indicators, we were unable to 
obtain results similar to the ones just reported. The reason is most likely that the 
Role of Government module did not include questions asking people about their 
16 Because bivariate residuals are smaller in the case of Waves I and II, we refrain from 
presenting refined versions of those models here. 
17 Due to space constraints, we do not report details for this exercise here, but results are 
available upon request.
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assessment of the status quo.18 Because those questions prime answers to questions 
about absolute preferences, they cannot be separated empirically from indicators 
about abstract attitudes.
Putting all three waves together, we find that for two of the waves (Wave I 
and IV), the coefficient on income is negative, as one would expect, but for Wave 
II it is positive. We also see that signs for some macro-level variable coefficients 
are not stable across waves. Income redistribution and economic growth are some-
times associated with less (more) solidarism and unemployment with more (less) 
solidarism. These findings raise an important question: why are the effects of some 
variables inconsistent across waves? Rather than attempt to generalize when such 
generalizations are not warranted, we conclude that there is much about the rela-
tionship between personal/family income and macro-level variables that we still do 
not understand, particularly for developing and/or newer democracies such as those 
surveyed in Wave IV. 
Dimick et al. (2017, p. 386) found evidence that “an increase in macro-
inequality will lead to a larger increase in support for redistribution from the rich 
than from the poor”. This occurs, they posit, because “an increase in redistribution 
aimed at reducing inequality is less costly (in welfare terms) to a richer person than 
to a poorer person” (i.e., the wealthy value an additional dollar of consumption less 
than the poor).19 Haggard et al. (2013, p. 113) found, however, that in the developing 
world, “inequality has limited effects on demands for redistribution and may even 
dampen them.” Others relate support for redistribution to its visibility (Gingrich 
2014). Finally, some point out that spending on benefits locks some recipients into 
coalitions in favor of continued benefits (e.g. Timmons 2005).
Contradicting claims may reflect the reality that some variables, income in 
particular, are measured with error. Another possibility is that the effects of macro-
level variables on attitudes differ between the more settled environments of devel-
oped countries and the more fluid situation we find in less developed ones. More 
generally, we believe that if people were fully informed, they would have no prob-
lems grasping the “inter-temporal trade-off between current and future income” 
that social policies entail (Barber et al. 2013, p. 1157). The cross-sectional nature 
of our research does not allow us to explore how stable over time the effects of 
these variables are, but it does allow us to realize that when care has been taken to 
specify the proper model, the relationship between covariates and the latent vari-
able may not be the same across countries and/or waves.
18 There is no prompt in any of the surveys querying respondents about pro-poor policies 
specifically. These policies figure prominently in the welfare states of all advanced 
democratic nations. 
19 See also Dimick et al. (2018). 
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Conclusion 
This article has made a major contribution to the comparative political economy 
literature. As stated at the outset, solidarism, or care about the well-being of others, 
is usually treated as any attitude that cannot be explained using standard assump-
tions about self-interest. We have shown that this is not the case. Our empirical 
model provides strong support for the notion that solidarism is a coherent ori-
entation among certain members of the public and it may or may not stem from 
“objective” indicators of wellbeing such as (relative) income, employment status, 
and education. Specifically, the model allowed us to measure these attitudes, thus 
helping overcome the by now stale divide between scholars who emphasize self-
interested considerations over solidaristic behavior or vice-versa. We were able to 
do this while acknowledging the complexity of the relationship between contextual 
variables such as income redistribution and individual attitudes. 
In addition to putting solidarism on a firmer empirical footing, this article 
made three other important contributions to the literature. First, we established 
some conceptual clarity regarding social policy preferences and how to measure 
them in a valid and reliable way. Second, we sorted through the thicket of how 
abstract preferences regarding the welfare state and information about its perfor-
mance can affect each other. Finally, we showed how latent manifestations of these 
preferences might not be equivalent across countries.
We applied mixture modeling (LCA) to three waves of the International 
Social Survey Programme’s module on social inequality. Our key findings are that 
preferences towards the market and the role of government in the economy form 
four distinct clusters of individuals that we refer to as “moderate altruists”, “moder-
ate egoists”, “extreme altruists”, and “extreme egoists”. These clusters tend to be 
homogenous with respect to both abstract notions of the role of government in the 
economy as well as about evaluations of actual performance. We do find, however, 
one notable exception in the last two survey waves, as one class consists of indi-
viduals who are solidaristic with respect to some indicators, but self-interested with 
respect to others. 
Looking at differences in results between waves, it appears as if attitudinal 
classes are context specific. We would expect the particular countries and indica-
tor variables we study to affect class configurations. Our pooled analysis revealed, 
however, a configuration of classes across waves that is similar to the configurations 
found within them despite the smaller number of indicators used and heterogeneity 
introduced by pooling countries. There is something to be gained then from seeing 
latent classes as capturing four distinct types of attitudes that are fundamentally 
similar across units of analysis.
In future work, scholars should provide better accounts of why certain vari-
ables differ in their effects on attitudes across countries. The literature abounds with 
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claims about the relationship between variables such as inequality and redistribu-
tive preferences, but these works usually presume that effects are uniform across 
units while leaving direct country effects unexamined. As we have shown, even 
with an appropriate specification, such assumptions leave much to be explained. It 
is our hope that in the future, scholars not only measure attitudes more accurately, 
but also explain them better. 
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Appendix A. Countries used in the analysis
Wave I Wave II Wave IV
Australia Australia Argentina
Austria Austria Australia
Germany Germany Austria
Netherlands Norway Belgium
Switzerland United States Bulgaria
United Kingdom Czech Republic
United States Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Iceland
Italy
Japan
Korea (South)
Latvia
New Zealand
Norway
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Ukraine
United Kingdom
United States
Venezuela
